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and depths, affecting their detection and 
destruction. However, these adverse condi-
tions did nor discourage the specialists nor 
decrease their d rive. 
T he successes of this work are the 
d irect result of the functions carried out by the 
international supervisors and monitors. These 
reams of professionals, army or marine offi-
cers, and non-commissioned officers, are rep-
resenrarives of diverse countries rhroughom 
the Americas. Their principal mission is to 
supervise dcmining tasks, ensure rhat opera-
tions follow international demining norms 
and provide for the safety of rhe soldiers rhat 
execute the tasks. In addi tion, they participate 
in the planning of the tasks related ro impact 
surveys and certifying that the work is being 
carried our in compliance with strict securi ty 
norms. In order to carry out rhcse tasks, they 
must arrend an intense training program in 
order ro be qualified. Wirh rime, camaraderie 
and a sense of purpose begin ro develop with-
in the demin ing teams; rhese aspects con-
tribute significantly to strengthening the ries 
between civilians and the military. Thus, the 
confidence and affection of the civilian popu-
latio n toward their soldiers are reinforced. 
On a daily basis, rhe ream coordi-
nates with national military authorities rhat 
are responsible fo r clearing their territories. 
They have the responsibility of suspending 
work if it is not being executed in accordance 
with established norms. However, they musr 
also observe the realities of the terrain and par-
ticular siwations and ensure that they do not 
become an impediment to the work, all while 
staying within the perspective of security. 
One of the most imporranr aspects 
o f rhis type of work, where the daily 
relationship of soldiers from diverse countries 
is motivated by the sense of serving a country 
and the international community, is rhe sig-
nificant increase in confidence and security 
rhe community gains. A situation that demon-
strates rhis rook place last year between Peru 
and Ecuador. These two governments com-
mitred to clearing areas in Peru and formed a 
sense of camaraderie as rhey worked toward a 
humanitarian objective. These efforts were 
significant in helping to overcome historical 
differences between nations and in calming 
the mine-related fears of Peruvians. 
Although confronted w ith hard 
work and transferred to border areas where 
memories of conflict can easily return, the 
teams strive roward the objective of cama-
raderie and a humanitarian end. This is seen 
in the displayed energy of sold iers as they 
demonstrate motivation for what rhey are 
doing. They can personally verif}r how recov-
ered terrain is now being utilized for agricul-
tural production in once-affected regions. 
Additionally, rhey directly receive the expres-
sions of fondness from rhe people when rhey 
see rheir lands cleared and rerurned. 
The unit commanders designated 
by the host country to direct these missions 
discover how their capacity ro manage can 
exceed borders. The resul t of rhei r efforts nor 
only is projected directly ro rhe communi ties 
of their own countries, but also remains 
inserted in the international community. This 
is because they have taken parr in an effort 
where various countries participate in human-
itarian objectives and goals. 
The d emining experiences carried 
our by Armed Forces personnel have achieved 
great results in respect to fulfi ll ing a job with a 
high incidence of security. These tasks have 
cleared terrai n contaminated by mines and 
have offered tranquility and secu rity to rhe cit-
izens rhar live in these sectors. Thus, rhe 
efforts of international organizations aimed 
toward peace and security in rhe hemisphere 




During 2003, important efforts 
toward the elimination of AP mines sown in 
Central America were accomplished. T he 
number of mines and UXO that have been 
destroyed as of August 31, 2003, reached a 
total of 28,793. The area cleared reached 
1,280,453 sq m among the coun tries of Cosra 
Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
In April 2002, MARMlNCA began 
ro support the humanitarian demin ing activi-
ties both in Peru and Ecuador. MARMINCA 
sent international supervisors on assignment, 
suppl ied technical assistance to rhe armies, 
and d ictated basic courses to the sappers and 
Demining Operation Planning. 
l n I 998, Ecuador and Peru initiat-
ed the task of eliminating mines from their 
respective territories. Both countries devel-
oped different methods for demining their ter-
ritories, realizing that their situations were dif-
ferent. Ecuador rarified the Ottawa 
Convention on April 20, 1999. Later, o n 
September 22, 1999, the Demining Center of 
Ecuador (CENDESMI) was created through 
Executive Decree Number 1297. In March 
2001, rhe agreement between Ecuador and 
the OAS was signed and pur into practice with 
the AICMA program. Peru, in turn, devel-
oped the first phase of demining operations in 
1999 with bilateral assistance from the United 
Stares and Canada. In May 200 I, the OAS 
and rhe Peruvian government signed the 
agreement for the coordination of internation-
al support, through rhe AICMA. On May I, 
2003, MARMINAS was created wi th head-
quarters in Zarumilla, Peru. 
onciUSIOn 
As an observer, I have seen the 
importance of humanitarian demining in 
Central and South America. The important 
and unselfish work carried our by rhe Armed 
Forces wi thi n the different roles that they exe-
cute is inspiring. Through this article, one can 
only visualize the great successes of the OAS 
and lA DB's coordinated efforts between civil-
ian and military organizations. Although nor 
well known, rhey have achieved a great degree 
of success in liberating countries from rhe 
threat o f AP mines, allowing for economic 
and developmental activities to boom in coun-
tries. It only remains to congratulate rhe 
efforts of all of the members of rhe demining 
battalions for rheir unselfish work, which 
make praiseworthy the activities of rhc mili-
taries today and project their role for rhe 
furure. 
Contact Information: 
First photo c/o JADE. 
Second photo c/o AI'. 
Colonel Mellado 
Inter-American Defense Board 
2600 NW 16th Street 




In November 2003, rhe Stares 
Parries ro the Convention on Certain 
Conventional Weapons (CCW) met in 
Geneva and agreed ro rhe creation of a fifth 
protocol on explosive remnants of war 
(ERW). 1 This new international humanitari-
an law is designed ro minimise the risks and 
effects of ERW in the post-conflict period. 
While rhe Ottawa Convention has 
focused attention on the issue of AP land-
mines, the mine action community has long 
known rhar in rhe post-conflict environment, 
rhere are many different explosive hazards that 
can be found. In 2000, ir was rhe high num-
ber of injuries caused by cluster bomblcts in 
Kosovo that led rhe lnrernarional Committee 
of the Red C ross (I CRC) to call fo r new inter-
national law to address ERW2 Three years 
later, the new "Protocol on Explosive 
Remnants of War" was concluded. 
The new protocol is a recognmon 
by rhe states of the serious post-conflict 
humanitarian problems caused by ERW. The 
protocol contains 11 articles and a separate 
(non-binding) technical annex. These articles 
specify post-conflict remedial measures of a 
generic nature co minimise rhe humanitarian 
risks and effects of ERW. The main articles in 
this p rotocol are Article Two, which provides 
definitions of explosive ordnance (EO), UXO, 
abandoned EO and ERW, thereby becoming 
a legal term in international law;3 Article 
Three, wh ich covers clearance, removal or 
destruction of ERW; and Article Four, on rhe 
recording, retaining and transmission of infor-
mation. 
The future successful impact of the 
protocol will d epend on how the states imple-
ment irs contents. There is scope for differen t 
interpretations of whar is requi red from signa-
tories. However, if we rake a positive view and 
by Paul Ellis, Technology and Standards Expert, 
GICHD 
assume the states enact all measures of the pro-
tocol and the technical annex, the main differ-
ence for rhe members of mine action commu-
nity will be to make their job easier and more 
efficient in the post-conflict period. 
First, the disciplines of mine clear-
ance and mine risk education (MRE) should 
benefit. 4 T he prorocol makes Stares Parries 
responsible, to varying degrees, for the provi-
sion of resources (technical, financial, material 
and personnel) to undertake work in these 
areas. What is nor clear, however, is how many 
and through which channels resources will be 
allocated. The protocol allows for the states ro 
undertake work in such areas as clearance, sur-
vey and MRE, either directly or via a third 
parry (which could be rhc U nited Nations or 
other supra-national body) or other parries 
involved in post-conflict clearance, such as 
no n-governmental organisations (NGOs).5 
There may be a concern rhar mili-
tary forces, with little understand ing of the 
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List of the Articles in the Protocol on 
Explosive Remnants of War11 
Preamble 
Article I: General provision and scope of 
application 
Article 2: Definitions 
Article 3: Clearance, removal or destruction 
ofERW 
Article 4: Recording, retaining and transmission 
of information 
Article 5: Other precautions for the protection of 
the civilian population, individual civilians and 
civilian objects from the risks and effects of ERW 
Article 6: Provisions for the protection of 
humanitarian missions and organisations from 
the effects of ERW 
Article 7: Assistance with respect to existing ERW 
Article 8: Cooperation and assistance 
Article 9: Generic preventive measures 
Article I 0: Consultations of high contracting 
parties 
Article Il: Compliance 
Technical Annex: Contains the suggested best 
practice for achieving the objectives contained in 
Articles 4, 5 and 9 of this protocol. High 
contracting parties will implement this technical 
annex on a voluntary basis. 
* Part 1: Recording, storage and 
release of information for UXO and 
abandoned EO 
* Part II: Warnings, MRE, marking, fencing 
and monitoring 
* Part III: Generic preventive measures 
come from the release 
of information. The 
protocol asks the states 
and parties to an 
armed conflict to pro-
vide information, as far 
as practicable, to assist 
mine action. The spe-
cific list of information 
is provided in the tech-
nical annex and 
includes: the targets 
for EO, approximate 
amoums used, the type 
and nature of EO, and 
general locations of 
known and probable 
UXO. Further, provi-
sion is specifically 
made to provide infor-
mation on abandoned 
munitions, including 
rhe location, approxi-
mate numbers and 
types of munitions 
abandoned. Of partic-
ular relevance to clear-
ance and MRE is the 
recommendation that 
information on UXO 
should include meth-
ods o f identification 
and methods for the 
"safe disposal" of EO.? 
Agai n, while the path 
by which information 
is passed is not precise, 
the text of the protocol 
is clear that NGOs are 
included as possible 
recipients of informa-
tion.S 
The key to rhe 
rake a more acti ve role. Recem studies suggest 
that military units are not ideally suited to all 
aspects of mine action, though they do have 
some relevam capabilities. 6 U nder the proto-
col, it could be argued that we will see the mil-
itaty playing an increased role. However, it is 
unlikely that we will see rhe military emering 
mine action in larger numbers than in previ-
ous rimes. T he world's militaries, with limi ted 
resources and a large number of competing 
tasks, will probably continue to welcome rhe 
assistance of mine action organisations. 
Indeed, rhe protocol repeatedly states rhar 
stares can use a third parry to deal with ERW. 
T he second positive impact will 
military-mine action 
community relationship will be rhe imple-
mentation of rhe Protocol V articles. In many 
countries, contingency plann ing for post-con-
flier work is already done jointly by aid organ-
isations and governments. This work now 
needs to be expanded to ensure that military 
forces also rake into account the requirements 
of the protocol on ERW. T hese issues are nor 
something that can be field-tested, but by 
engaging with the political and military actors 
now, NGOs can at least provide evidence of 
rheir experience in these matters, which states 
will hopefully recognise as useful for imple-
menting the protocol on ERW. 
The Fifth Protocol is not perfect. 
Many believe thar the language is roo condi-
tional, and these caveats allow stares ro do lit-
de and yet still legally fu lfil their obligations. 
Many would have liked rhe technical annex to 
be legally binding. Many of the cri ticisms are 
right; from a humanitarian point of view rhe 
p rotocol could have been stronger. However, 
diplomacy such as these negotiations over the 
last three years is rhe art of rhe possible. The 
coordinator of the discussions on ERW, 
Ambassador Chr is Sanders of rhe 
Netherland s, stated in the final session of 
debate that in h is view, the text was the best 
that could be achieved at the timc.9 
Ambassador Sanders is the only person who is 
fu lly aware of the haggling and compromises 
required to ger to the final rext; his judgement 
that the protocol was the best the process 
could produce is probably accurate. 
For proponents of a stronger proto-
col there was some risk to continuing the d is-
cussions. T he alternative to not agreeing in 
November 2003 would have been to p rolong 
the discussions for at least another year, if not 
more. There were many States and NGOs who 
were concerned that furthe r negotiatio ns 
would result in a further weakening of the text. 
The issues had, after all, been exhaustively de-
bared and few could see what new grounds for 
discussion existed. Significanrly, many of the 
srates who agreed w the protocol are nor part 
of the Ottawa Convention, including India, 
Pakistan, Russia, China and the United States. 
Overall, rhe protocol has the agreement of 92 
nations, although the states still have to indi-
vidually sign the protocol.' 0 
If the Fifth Protocol contributes 
anything, it is a requirement rhar rhe states 
now consider the humanitarian impact of 
ERW and they have some guidance on the 
measures rhar can be used to reduce the effects 
in the post-conflict environment. Much will 
depend on how the states will implement the 
protocol. Some of the states have already start-
ed to consider the implications of rhe proto-
col-the United Kingdom used the 2002 
Gulf Conflict to rest some of its ideas for deal-
ing with ERW, such as in formation provision 
to clearance organisations. 
The challenge ahead is to ensure 
that the protocol is implemented in the 
strongest possible manner. While the text of 
rhe protocol carries many caveats, such as 
"where feasible" and "where possible," it is for 
states to d ecide how to incorporate the terms 
of the protocol into their military doctrine. 
The importance of bow the protocol is imple-
mented is perhaps most clearly shown with 
regard to the technical annex. The annex sets 
out clear requirements on the provision of 
information for ordnance used , the obliga-
tions concerning abandoned munitions and to 
whom information is to be given; however, ir 
is all voluntary. The provisions of the tech ni-
cal annex are nor onerous, and it might 
become a measure of a stare's commitment to 
dealing with ERW as to whether or not they 
adop t the technical annex along wirh the for-
mal protocol. 
The mine action community could 
- and should-provide a pivotal role by 
engaging with policy makers wherever possi-
ble ro ensure that states introduce the terms of 
the protocol and the technical an nex into their 
military doctrine. For example, the mine 
action community can provide field experi-
ence to illustrate the importance of informa-
tion provision in reducing the humani tarian 
impact of ERW. For organisations involved in 
mine action, now is the opportunity to try to 
influence how the protocol is implemented. 
Where countries require national legislation to 
enact rhe protocol, political pressure can be 
used to ensure that a state introduces all meas-
ures of the p rotocol and perhaps goes even 
further, for example, by making the provisions 
of the technical annex legally binding. Once 
procedures and laws are written , ir will be 
much more difficult to persuade governments 
to rewrite rhem. H ow stares implement the 
rreary is where the furure success of the proto-
col will be decid ed. 
I. The full title of rhc convention is ''The Convemion 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on rhe Use of Certain 
Conventional Weapons \XIhich May be Deemed to be 
Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects." 
The framework convention has five prorocols, which ban or 
restrict rhe use o f various types of weapons that are deemed 
to cause unnecessary suffering or affect ei ther sold iers or 
civilians indiscrim inately. The weapons covered include: 
weapons thar leave undetectable fragments in the body 
(Prorocol I); mines, booby-traps and ot·her devices 
(Prorocol II , amende d in 1996); incendiary weapons 
(Proroeol Ill); blinding laser weapons (Protocol IV); and 
ERW (Prorocol V). A5 of March 2004, rhere were 92 states 
that were party to the convenrion. 
2. For a history of how the ERW process began and 
was developed, see: "Explosive Remnants of War: The 
Impact of Curren t Negotiations," Paul Ell is1 journal of 
Mine Action. Issue 7 .1 , April 2003; and "' Explosive 
RemnarHS of\XIar: The Negotiations Contin ue," Paul Ellis, 
Journal o[Mi1u Actio11, i>sue 7.2, August 2003. 
3. The definition of EO excludes mines, booby tra ps 
and orher devices as defined in Prorocol I I of rhe CCW. 
While there is rarely a clear disrincrion between rhe location 
of mines and UXO. booby traps and rdued devices could 
nor be included in rhis protocol on ER\V for legal reasons, 
as they already had their own Prmocol (II. amended 1996). 
4. Vicrim assistance does nor have the same promi-
nence in Protocol V as in [he Onawa Convention. The 
issue of how much prominence to give tO vicrim assistance 
was strongly debated. A number of countries, parricubr lr 
South Africa, argued for much !ltronger provision for this 
area. ln the end it was nor possible ro do more rhan include 
ir as a paragraph in Article 8 on Cooperat ion and 
Assistance. 
5. Article 3 of the prowcol on "CIC"arance, Removal or 
Destruction of ER\Xf.'' paragraph 5. states: "High 
Contracting Parries shall cooperate, where appropriate, 
both among themselves and with other states, relevant 
regional and inrcrnarional organisations and non·govern~ 
memaJ organisations on the provision of inter alia tcchn i~ 
cal, financial, material and human resources assistance 
including, in appropriate circumstances, the undertaking of 
joint operations necessary ro fulfil rhe provisions of this 
Art icle ... 
6. See Tbe Role ofth' Military in M i11e Action, GICHD, 
2003. 
7. The rechnical annex has adopted many of the in for~ 
marion requirements thar the rnine action community 
asked for, see the report Explmivt' Rttnnmw of \f'nr-
Jnfonnmion Requiremen/s, G ICHD, 2003. 
8. In Technical Annex l.c.ii, it is stated that: 
"Recipient: The information should be released ro rhe party 
or parties in conrrol of rhe affecred territory and to those 
persons or insti tutions that the releasing Stare is satisfied 
are, or will be, involved in UXO or AXO !abandoned 
explosive ord na nce] clearance in the affected area. in the 
edu cation of rhe civilian population on rhe risks of UXO 
and AXO." 
9 . Paul Ellis' personal norcs from the Meeting of the 
Group of Government Experts to the CC\'7, Geneva, 24 
November 2003. 
I 0. The protocol will come inro fOrce six months after 
the 20th rJ.tification by a srare. 
11. T he full tt:xt of rhe convenrion in rhe six l anguage.~ 
of rhe United Narions can be fo und on rhe GICHD web-
sire at: http://www.gichd.ch/CCW/index.htm or rhe UN 
Departmen t of Disarmament Affai rs websir~: hrtp:// 
disarmamenr2.un.orglccw/index.html, accessed 29 March 
2004 . 
* Photo c/o JCRC. 
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Rethinking Humanitarian Demining Efforts, continued 
from page 27 
Conclusion 
So where do we go from here? 
Although our focus is to eliminate donor 
funding in rl1c future, we are worki ng with the 
IC and the BHMAC ro generate donor fund-
ing for rhe initial equipment costs. We are 
confident that lC donors will support this ini-
tiative based on rhe much-improved rate of 
return for their investment in this future EU 
member. Over the next few months, the team 
will be working with the SFOR AF BiH 
Restructuring Working Group to integrate 
rh is demining initiative into rhe future of 
BiH. Based on guidance from the OHR, the 
new military structure for BiH is to be imple-
mented in Januaty of 2004. The Defense 
Review Commission is working diligently to 
resolve any legislative or legal roadblocks fo r 
restructuring success. lf we are successful, the 
ream sees this as the beginning of a new era fo r 
coalition military operations. BiH is at a cross-
roads in its history where it may be the best 
suited and most capable country to help coali-
tion countries make this paradigm shift. 
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